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1 - INTRODUCTION 
The theory of economic plannning is a very extensive 
field which has benefited in the last decades from the 
development and application of mathematical programming to the 
problem of allocating scarce resources in societies subject to 
authoritarian planning. The litarature is vast but instead 
of surveying all important contributions, we will concentrate 
in this paper on appraising the role and the desirable 
properties of decentralization in planning theory and on 
reviewing and comparing three decentralized procedures for 
planning in the light of these properties. The first two are 
price-guided procedures while the third is not, relying on 
quantity messages, and all procedures are short run. Restricting 
our attention to the most common approaches to the Planning 
problem will permit us to understand the advantages of 
decentralization in greater detail, We sill start by examining 
the structure of the planning problem and the characteristics 
of descentralization. 
2 ~ THE NATURE OF THE PLANNING PROBLEM 
A short run decentralized or multi-level planning 
procedure is an iterative procedure which aims to solve the 
problem of finding an optimal plan for activity for a centrally 
planned economy in the near future,
It is relevant mostly for developed economies where 
planners are concerned with maintaining the efficient day to 
day running of the economy and is applicable only to economies 
where Phaltove nent an. if necessary, give binding directives 
concerning consumption and production plans to all consumers and 
producers in the economy. In these command economies, the 
programming of government activities requires that policy makers 
sesk to achieve certain goals while limited by external 
constraints in their range of possible actions, 
Planning is viewed here as a contrained maximization of 
some target function of variables regarded as social objectives: 
the objective function subject to imposed constraints. 
In the task of approaching the planning of an economy 
a5 a constrained maximization problem, the first step is to 
identify the "choice variables" — the variabels whose levels 
the planning authority is responsible for choosing, and upon 
which the success of the plan depends. These variables are 
embodied in the state of the economy which can be determined 
in detail by the planning authority by choosing a value for 
every economically important: and controlable variable[Heal 1973). 
The State of the economy is represented by a vector x 
whose components are the amount of each input used, and of 
output produced by each firm. The values assumed py the 
components of x may be restricted to be non-negative and depend 
on the contraints imposed by, say, limited resource endowment, 
technology etc, When x satisfies all constraints it is said to 
be feasible. 
The set x of all feasible states of economy may be taken 
as an economy-wide production possibility set, since it depends 
on the endowments and on the technology of the economy. 
The problem faced by the planning authority involves 
choosing the x¢X which gives the highest posible value to an 
objective function u(x). This objective function represents 
social preferences between alternative states of the economy, 
indicating to the planning authority how desirable a state of 
the economy is. these preferences are depicted by a set of 
Smooth non-intersectiong social indifference curves (defined so 
as to satisfy the requirements of completeness, transitivity 
and continuity ")) which make is possible to establish a weak 
order on the alternative states, Thus, finding the feasible 
State of the economy which gives the highest value of the 
objective function (being, in general, of ordinal significance 
only) is equivalent to finding the most preferred of the 
feasible states. 
There are nbteriaenve approaches suggesting that the 
planning procedure should not be viewed as the maximization of 
an objective function, but rather in the form of a set of targets 
to be attained. As exposed by Kornai (1967) planners may choose 
target values for the variables which they consider important 
(Ql The concests xelevant to the specification of an objective function and to the study of social preferences will not be revised here, We refer to the welfare theory presented in Malinvaud(1972),
and then attempt to find the feasible plan which is some sense 
conforms best to these targets, Although subject to several 
limitations this approach is often adopted in practice,possibly 
due to the difficulties encountered in constructing an objective 
‘function, It can, however, be seen as a reformulation of the 
constrained maximization approach, since a constrained 
maximization problem has to be solved if feasible and efficient 
plans are to be found. 
Having examined the nature of the objective function 
to be maximized in the planning procedure we now turn to the 
Nature of the constraints which restrict the set of possible 
States of the economy. 
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These constraints may be of two kinds: resource 
constraints and technological constraints, The former are’ due 
to the fact that the supply of inputs available to an economy 
is limited, in the short run, by exogenous factores beyond the 
control of planners. The latter refer to technological 
conditions determining and limiting the production process by 
specifying the relationship between the imputs and outputs of 
that process. These conditions are certainly not fixed over 
time, but are dependent on the rate of technical progress, 
Over a long enough time period the two types of 
contraints can be varied within certain limits, and Can be 
affected by the nature of the economic program adopted, '2) 
—_—_ 
(2) mepens (1972) argues that, even in the short-run the. xogenous , te Initiative of’ the entroprencire) Y * Heater supply of effort or 
short run plans however these constraints are exogenously 
determined, 
3 - CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DECENTRALIZED PLANNING PROCEDURE 
Since we will be concerned in this paper with 
decentralized procedures for constructing short run plans,before 
describing the characteristics of decentralization, we will start 
by examining the meaning of the short run in the planning context. 
The traditional definition of short run is that of a 
period in which the capital stock is fixed, or, in which the 
resource constraints cannot be altered. In practice such a 
period is ussualy of five years, since it generally takes at 
least this amount of time for projecting, creating and adopting 
new technologies. 
An alternative definition of short run can be given in 
terms of plans that provide a rather complete description of 
production and distribution. The longer the period considered, 
the more difficult it is in practice to construct a detailed 
plan. The short-run is thus said to be the period (usually up 
to five years) in which this detailed plan is feasible. 
Before assessing the planning procedure asa constraired 
maximization problem, the conditions under which such a problem 
may be solved have to he established. The first point to note
is that any procedure for solving a large maximization problem 
has to be an iterative process . in which the solution is found 
by taking sucessive approximations leading to sucessibely 
improved solutions. More Specifically, this method - a routine 
Or algorithm - generally takes the following form: initially 
an arbitrary plan is proposed and certain indices associated ° 
with it are calculated. some modifications are then made in 
the light of these indices, and from this, the next proposed 
plan is derived. The same indices are again calculated, and 
so on. 
The reason for using such an approach is the large 
size of the problem facing the planning authority, involving 
too many equations and too Many unknowns to be solved at once, 
and giving rise to the following difficulties: 
1. It becomes virtually impossible to concentrate in 
the Central Planning Bureau all the information required to 
formalize the planning problem, Also, the transmission Of the 
relevant information from numerous sources to the CPB (from 
here on the Central Planning Bureau will be called CPB) woulda 
induce many kinds of error. 
2. Even if it were possible to gather all the 
pertinent information in the CPB, it would be a formidable task 
to integrate and process it, as Von Hayek (1945) emphasizes, 
These difficulties bring the need for breaking down 
the planning problem into a number of independent Operations 
of manageable size to be performed by different agencies. This 
characterizes the so-called devantralized procedure for planninea 
discussed by Von Hayek (1945) and Malinvaud (1967). The main 
feature of such a procedure is that all the information available 
to the CPB and to individual firms is never pooled together in 
one place, 
AS an illustration of the informational decentralization 
process we might say that the CPB has information about the 
Nature of the objective function and about the economy wide 
constraints. The CPB also has the task of ensuring that overall 
accounting constraints are satisfied. It delegates to the 
individual firms the responsibility of satisfying these 
constraints since they have information only abour their own 
processes in which these constraints are embodied. 
What is essential in the decentralized precedure is that 
the over-al} planning problem is broken into a number os sub- 
problems each relating to and delegated to the subsectors of 
the economy. We note also that during the process of calculating 
a plan both the CPB and the individual firms play an equally 
important role in the transmission of information and in the 
calculation of the plan. 
4 - DESIRABLE PROPERTIES oF A DECENTRALIZED PLANNING PROCEDURE | 
Several desirable properties have been mentioned in
  
the literature for characterizing a decentralized procedure: 
- It’is generally expected that the message transmitted 
by a firm at any stage can depend only on the production 
possibilities of than firm (or ,analogously ,on consumption 
possibilities and preferences of consumers, if it is the case). 
and on information received in Garly stages. Also the message 
transmitted by a firm is supposed to concern only the proposed 
actions of that firm (consumers), This Property has been 
referred to as the property of informational privacy. 
- Another desfrable property which is known as the 
anonimity requirement states that the agents need not know the 
sources of the information that they receive. 
Wenote that the above properties are of little normative 
significance, inasmuch as in assessing the value of a-planning 
process it is more important to verify if the amount of 
information transmitted was minimized (since it introduces costs, 
delays and errors) even if it conflicts with the above properties, 
It has been observed in practice, however, that on the Whole non- 
Satisfaction of any of them will increase the amount of 
information to be handled. 
- Monotonicity, another Property whose importance was 
stressed by Malinvaud(1967), is said to exist if the value of 
the objective function increases from one stage to the next (or 
remains the same in case the solution to the constrained maximization problem has been found, and the Plan which 
constitutes the solution is as optimum). 
~ The feasibility property requires that every plan 
proposed during the’iterative process be feasible. 
These last to properties are very important because 
they guarantee that whenever the iterative procedure is 
han terminated, the Jast step is both feasible and better t a 
the previous steps. 
It is also desirable that the planning problem converges 
to an optimum as the iterations are repeated sufficiently many 
times. Convergence is, however, an assymptotic property of 
little practical use since the iterations will be carried out 
only a finite number of times. Tt js therefore the result obtained 
after a finite number of steps that’ really matters. 
As can be'seen in thediagram below, both procedures A and 
B satisfy the monotomicity property byt A converges to an 
optimum and B does not. In this case, if less than n iterations 
will be carried out, procedure B should be chosen over A since 
it yields a higher level of the objective function. 








Finally, it is desirable that the planning procedure 
performs satisfactorily in as many diverse environments aS 
possible; in particular it should function for as many types of 
economies as possible. The importance of this comes from the 
fact that it is always necessary to make some assumption about 
the technology of the economy to be Planned, and the procedure 
to be chosen should fit the reality as closely as possible. 
in regard to the costs of different procedures 
considered institutionally feasible, lowest cost is not 
considered a criterion for choice because the rules to be 
followed by firms must be simple, to avoid the risk of being 
incorrectly followed. 
5 - REVIEW OF PLANNING PROCEDURES 
In what follows we will examine three procedures for 
calculating short run economic plans. The first is a clear 
imitation of the market mechanism and the second embodies at | 
“least some of its features. Both are price quided procedures 
which rely on some form of convexity assumptions and therefore 
do not perform satisfactorily in the presence of production 
functions subject to increasing returns to scale. The third 
process circumvents this limitation and differs quite radically 
from the first two; It makes no use of prices, but of 
quantitative targets, and Operates in the presence of 
increasing returns to scale, 
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5.1 - Review of Two Price Guided Procedures 
The theory of economic planning has been benefiting 
from the efforts of the so-called economic theory of socialism 
towards characterizing an ovotimal plan. Such characterization 
was made precise as a result of the progress made in the theory 
of resources allocation, 4) and it has been shown in the 
literature that an:optimal plan inthe socialist’ economy should 
Satisfy the same marginal conditions held in equilibrium under 
perfect competition, 
More explicit discussions of the protess of plan 
formation are found in Lange (1936), Taylor (1929), and 
Kantorovich .(1959), who have based their analyses on the 
Walrasian concept of tatonnement. Lange's propositions have 
been formalized in a very thorough study by Arrow and Hurwicz 
(1960), while Taylor's have been formalized by Malinvaud (1967). 
The Arrow-Hurwicz and the Malinvaud procedures for planning 
will be reviewed in the following pages. 
5.1.1 The Arrow-lurwicz Procedure 
This approach consists basically in following the 
Walrasian tatonnement, a process by which a competitive economy 
may reach the equilibrium. The objective of the process is to 
locate an equilibrium price vector; that is, a set of prices 
that will clear the market. 
  
(4) Koopman's(1957), first chapter, constitutes an excellent review on 
the subject.
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According to this process, all buyers and sellers are 
gathered together in the presence of an auctioneer who quotes 
the price for each good and Service, The buyers and seliers 
then state tentatively how much they are willing to buy and 
sell, respectively,at the given prices. The auctioneer then 
revises the prices raising the prices of goods in excess 
demand and Lowering those of goods in exces; supply. Trade will 
not occur until an equilibrium price vector equating supply 
and demand is found. The success of the tatonnement in locating 
4 market-clearing price vector depends on the assumption of 
gross substitutability being Satisfied, i.e., that when the 
price of a gocd rises, the demand for every other good must 
rise, ruling out the existence of complementarity between any 
goods, 
«. 
The Arrow-Hurwicz planning procedure is related to a 
tatonnement in the following way: firms ave given a vector of 
prices by the CPB and then they calculate the production programs 
which would maximize profits and inform the CPB of the Supplies, 
corresponding to those prices, The CPB then distributes the 
profits among consumers who, facing given profit shares and wage 
rates, choose their consumption bundles and inform the CPE, which 
acting as an auctioneer, raises the prices of goods in excess 
demand and conversely lowers prices if there is excess supply. 
The process continues until the set of production and consumption 
burdles converge (if so) to an equilibrium between supply and 
demand. 
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Although we have assumed so far that the planning 
procedure should specify both the output of the productive sector 
and the distribution of the output among consumers, the large 
number of consumers makes this last goal impractical. Due to 
this, the planning literature usually aims to characterize in 
detail only the productive sector of the economy, assuming the 
requirements and preferences of consumers to be reflected in 
the objective function. 
Given that the tatonnement-like process applies only to 
the productive sector in the plan implementation, the prices 
announced by the CPB can be interpreted as purely bookkeeping 
prices, Once the equilibrium price vector is attained firms are 
required to implement the production programs (complete 
specification of their inputs and outputs) that maximized profits 
at these prices. The government then chooses a manner to 
distribute the resulting outputs of consumption goods among 
consumers. We note that . besides taking the place of consumers 
at the auction, the CPB also determines the amount of labor 
that individuals ought to supply (since labor figures among the 
inputs specified by the firms). The CPB thus acts like a 
modified auctioneer, since it represents the preferences of 
individuals between consumption goods and also between work and 
leisure. Finally. it is assumed that all agents (CPB, firms and 
indivuals) are guided in their actions by an objective function 
representing social preferences. 
. . . ce The Arrow-Hurwicz planning procedure is formalized in Ne
14 
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; cure 5.1.2 - The Leontief-Samuelson-Malinvaud Procec 
We have seen that the Arrow-Hurwicz Procedure attempts 
‘ Tar to recreate in a planned economy setting, the results ae 
achieved through perfect competition. On the supply Saag 
maximize profits, and on the demand side utility is maximized 
x iid ction instead (assuming the existence of a social utility fun 
of individual ones). 
TPR Within that formulation, there was no need for the CPs 
to worry about efficient technologies or input-output qoefficients,
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since the mechanism similar to that of a free entreprise was 
supposed to take care of this. 
In the Leontief-Samuelson-Malinvaud Procedure an attempt 
is mage by the CPB towards representing the technology used by 
the firms: It builds a model embodying the equilibrium 
vonstraints on supply and demand and the technical constraints 
characteristic of each industry. This procedure is of greater 
wracticability, since in countries where some planning of 
production takes place, the Central Agency generally purports 
Le represent the technclogies employed by firms. 
In the Leontief-Samuelson-Malinvaud (L.S.M., for short) 
“rocedure, the CPB uses a Leontief model to represent these 
technologies, but it allows for variable input-output coefficients 
avoiding the major weakness in the original Leontief (1951)model, 
The basic idea for this procedure is due to Taylor's 
Proposal (1929) of an iterative method by which the cBp 
Ie td
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The CPB then revises its proposed prices in such a way 
that the price ef each good be exactly equal to the costs 
blied by the technical coefficients proposed by the firms. The 
ice of cach input is then adjusted downward or Upward (Chrough 
a tatonnement process) depending on whether the CPR forecasts a 
Surplus or deficit of the resource in question, by comparison 
with projected AVAIlabilities, 
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(5) This notation is the same as in Malinvaud (1972) po.117-123,
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The aim of the CPA is then to Hanne U(x} subject to 
the constraints x = (I - A®) and [£°]'g = Wy tempeeyeng ens 
equality conditions of suply and demand) and it is assumed 
that the Lagrange multiplier in the last constraint is not zero 
in the optimum, 
s Sis mouwt fhe CPB then solves p'(I - A’) = {f ]' to compute a 
new set of prices pers and determines x SO aS to maximize U(x) 
Subject to the constraint p'x = wy (which embodies the two 
aboye constraints plus the linear system solved to compute the
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new set or prices), Pinally, the cpp finds the correspondina 
: s vector g by solving x = (I-A dq. 
1 The prices p°* are again issued to the firms and the h 
process continues. 
At the final stage S+n, the CPB determines the plan J 3 a by calculating first the vector Ome 
DY Calculating amar so as to maximize U(x) Subject to the 
i 
constraint p (en) x = Wy, and last of all by finding gen = 
(r= aSttedy, 
Now let's summarize the Properties of this procedure 
fan extensive discussion of them is found in Malinvaud 1967): 
it satisfies the mono 
planing procedure. The feasibility and convergence properties 
ere also satisfied since each intermediate plan is feasible 
and the process leads to an optimal consumption vector ,given 
that U(s) is a strictly increasing function, 
We note that this procedure involves a "decomposition" cf the total Problem of maximizing U(x) subject to the constraints, Wich is similar to the "decomposition" method developed by Dantzig and Wolfe (1960). 
Another interesting feature of this procedure is that at each state the cpp learns more and more about the 
as above, then 
23 
acterize more technology of each firm, being able to charac 
exactly their production possibility sets. 
Malinvaud wicz and the !? 5.1.3 ~ Comparaison of the Arrow-Hurwi 
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pro 3 i " . ot 
firm. 
to the roduction poss ibilities 
of each i
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For this purpose, the sources of information are important and 
not only total amounts. We note also that the recipients of 
- information are differentiated in the L.S.Mm. Procedure since 
| 
the CPB locates an optimum and informs .the firms of the 
pesgaceton programs required of them, It is clear that the 
Esch proneiiane requires a larger amount of information to 
be handled, and as the number of firms is increased so are 
the information-handling costs imposed on the center, 
This brings to mind the issue of the optimal size of 
the firms. For both procedures an increase in the number of firms and 
@ reduction in their sizes brings advantages in terms of 
greater administrative flexibility within firms. In view of 
this, the optimun number of firms under a planning System might 
be defined in teens of the trade-off between administrative 
costs at the CPB against administrative cost at the firms. In 
other words, this number is such that the advantages to the 
“PB of a small reduction in the number of firms are just 
balanced by the disadvantages of decreased administrative 
flexibility within the individual firms resulting from the 
consequent increase in their sizes, 
This optimum number of firms will Clearly be different for the two Procedures, ft w: larger for the Arrow-Hurwicz 
Since the costs at the center bein 
number of firms, 
procedure, 
g unaffected by the 
the optimum Size of firms will depend only on the balance Of economies and diseconomies of administrative scale 
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fu there will within each firm. In the L.S.M. procedure, however, * 
their . i and reduce be an incentive to increase the size of firms 
if this B, even if number in order to reduce the costs at the CP 
ithin the firms. will create internal pkanning problems within 
S 10 procedures ha One further difference between the two = PB Cc ‘ med by the to do with the nature of the operations perfor! 
: . B is merely in each of them. In the Arrow-Hurwicz the CP 
ly mL 7 the excess Supp+} 
required to adjust prices proportionally to . 
erforms a mor or demand. In the L.S.M. procedure the CPB pe 
imi n ai maxim zatior 
= to solve a constra ned 
complex operation: It has to 
Problem at each step, 
ty iad d. feasibili With respect to the monotonicity and 
in advantage. The Properties the L.S.M. procedure seems to be . does not . ceaure rie reasoning here is that the Arrow-Hurwicz proce seit acieecca. 8s 
- staae = Satisfy the feasibility criterion: At any : Gina eceln: “ptimum, sopply and demand need not Bevedta cies does not 
at the optimum the value of the objective .. the other hand,the n th reflect the social value of the program. and in case the 
L.S.M 
jen 
procedure satisfies both properties, 
i, 
2 can & timality, we 
planning procedure is stopped short 
of op 
Sure that - 
t least as acod as any of the
 






n rgenc prope 
5 
With respect to 
2 conve
 e 
i to i since it converges 
cedure is also superior, 
Sin the L.S.M. pro 
i roperties are 
le know however that assumptotic 
pror 
an optimum. W  kn
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not of much relevance for practical application, since only a 
small number of stages will be performed. Nonetheless, Heal 
(1973) mentions that in simulatea experiments the:L.s.M. 
procedure has exibited faster convergence, 
5.2 - Non Price-Guided Procedure 
In constrast with the two Procedures above, where the information flows take the form of Prices, in this third one the propositions of the cpp take the form of allocations of inputs among firms. ‘This seems to show greater. similarity to wnat happens in practice, as has been found that in general actual planning bureaux communicate with the firms by informing then of input allocations, output targets, or both (Montias 1959), 
Fesides a possible move towards reconciling theory and practice this procedure has a further advantage: It can Se shown to perform satisfactorily in the Presence of 
naon-convexities of production frontiers, We saw that the previous procedures are heavily dependent on the assumption of convex preduction possibility’sets, In view of the u 
convexities is indisputable, 
The properties Of non-price guided Planning procedures 




is last author J, Kornai(1967) and Heal (1969 and 1973). Th 
. 
. ets with non- noted the possibility of using production targ 
: i he review in t convex production possibility sets, We will 
@ which he developed an following pages the pr 
: 
re. will be called hereafter the Heal procedu 
rocedure the 
Instead of quoting prices, in the Heal p 
. ai the : inputs amona CPB’ proposes, at each stage, an allocation of inp 
; 
that 
£ the outputs 
firms. These respend by informing 
e marginal these inputs would make possible and of th 
; ien, Possessing productivities of the inputs at this allocatic ral ss the marginal this information the CPB is enabled to asses 
h of its input in each o contribution to social welfare of each inp’ 
culates . the CPB calc uses Knowing these marginal social values, 
irst, inputs are i i ith the first, r @ new plan in which by comparison wi 
ow to moved from uses where their marginal social values ea
those where they are high. In other words a new ones ; 
is proposed, in which by comparison with the previous -_ 
resources have been shifted to uses where they are ~ rginal Marginally productive, and away from those where their marg 
. i he o an incrase int Contribution is least, each step leading to a 
social welfare. value of the objectice function representing 
in the Heal 




= amount of good i, i=l, --+, 
My produc 
Ya = 
by firm i; 
3, 3 . t,allocated = amount of resource j  j=l, ..-, m,al  xX. 
ji to firm i;
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Yies = amount of produced good K allocated to firm i; 
Fee Vigt tm 0¥ng = amount cf Produced 
final demand; 
to the economy; 
UM ere eer¥i a) = social welfare function, 
There are n firms indexed by isi, ‘e+, and each firm i produces only one output, good i, in amount y i’ ®¢cCording to the equation: 
"¥, = fi O05) seer X “mi? Yay toe, Yn) = (£5 (x,, ¥,). 
The production functions £ | are assumed to be continuous 
and differentiable {6) 
allocations, having Finite first Partia 
productivities) everywhere on this set. From this it follows that if the inputs availablé to a firm are bounded, so are the outputs that it can produce. 
. The objective Of the Planning Procedure ig to maximize 
uty. "tt" Yaa) subject to the input availab ility Constraints; 
nc 
Zz Yix & fils), i=l}. .in K=] 
the precious ones, makes ture Of the Production functions 
easing returns to scale, This   
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< R j-l, ...,m. *i3 < Rye isl 
and K. 
: _ > 0, for all i, j Yix 2 0; *44 = 
increases To find the solution to this problem, et seatea ina the allocation of a good to uses where its mee a qood toa 
value is high and vice versa. Such ie difference 
use is adjusted by an amount proportional to a the average 
between its marginal social value in that use , simple idea, of its marginal social values in all uses. This 
i ould ct that it c 
however, becomes complicated @ue to the fa 
ints. ivity constrai 
“ause violation of the non-negativity 
way of To avoid this situation Heal has devised vaivity 
implemeating this idea without violating the ee 
contraints, .The details of this method move anothen 
involved and we find no point in reviewing it here. « pevfomad 
reason for an increased complexity in the eee 
by the CPB is due to the fact that when it changes tput of the 
allocation of inputs to a production process, the en Pp opien 
process also changes. The CPB is thus faced with the p 
This iate goods . 
of allocating a Changing amount of intermedi 
Ss. ion equation 
also complicates the form of the reallocatio 
tial that the ini 
It is proved in jiea} (1969) that given tha 
ivity 
n-negativi 
allocation was -feasible,the feasibility and no 
—————--______. . 
ter 7. 
(7) Yor these details see teal (1969) and (1973), Chap
+30 
constraints will be satisfied during the process. He also Proves that the re-allocation Process leads to an optimum at the limit point, and that on the path by which these limit 
points are approached, the objective function increases monotonically. ‘Thus, given that the initial allocation was 
feasible, monotonicity, feasibility ana convergence to an 
optimum are established Eor the subsequent states. 
6 - COMPARISON OF THE THREE PLANNING PROCEDURES 
In this section we attempt to com 
procedures reviewed, 
sipce as we Saw, 
Therefore, 
few important features. 
in particular, we will he interesteq in comparing; 
1. Information requirements, 
2. Computational tasks, 
3. Assumptions about the nature of the economy, 
4, Convergence properties, 
Gtsadvantages is others, For example, more liberal assumptions 
ab é Out the Nature of the economy are associated with @ greater   
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computations. informational requirement and more complex 
i | we distinauish With respect to information requirements, 
B and vice versa. the information flows from the firms to the CP 
ity 
The : o-called anonim first thing to notice is that since the 5 ‘ 
tion less informa property is observed in the Arrow-Hurwicz much 
nly flows s, The only is required in this procedure than in the other 
of information are: 
r 
a , d. or each goo ) From the CPB to the firms - prices f 
b) From the firms to the CPB: 
be produced 
~ For each product, the total outmit to PB 
by all firms; 
1 firms. - For each good, the total demand by al 
The comparison of the L.S.M, and the Heal ae 
not easy because the anonimity property does not hold, eon CPB has to distinguish the source of each piece of informa . 
received. Here it is assumed that each firm produces only 
roduct. product and no two firms produce the same Pp: 
: ation are: In the L.S.M. procedure, the flows of inform 
the different 
a) From the CPB to firms: prices of 
products. 
technical 
Prom the firms to the CPB: vector of b : 






a) From the CPB to firms: quantities to be produced of the different Preducts, 
b) From the firms to cpp; Output ang marginal productivity of inputs, 
With respect to item al, information flowing from the CPB to firms, all procedures seen to be equivalent 7 : 
quantitative terms, With respect to item b), the Arrow-Hurwicz procedure is in clear advantage ,ang the Heal Procedure seems to be at a light disadvantage in relation to the L.S.M, While in the L.svm, Procedure the firms have to inform Only the technical coefficients, in the Heal brocedure, besides the marginal Productivities they also have to inform the quantities to be produces 
The next point of comparison is the computationa] t2Sks of the agents in each procedure, which are Summarize 
In the Arrow-Hurwicz, the computational] tasks are; 
1. Por the CPB: 
~ Maximize the amount by which 
Value of consumption; 
.~ Change Prices Proportionally to excess demands, 
2. For the firms; Maximize Profits at aiven prices, In the L.s.m. Procedure the tasks are: 
1. Tor the cpp; 
~ Solve a linea: System of Simultaneous equations 
a3 
‘ oducts; to calculate the prices of the different pr 
ximize the Find the global consumptions so as to nee 
.— 
s i utility function subject to linear con 
ed in order - Calculate the quantities to be vroduc 
i iven the to satisfy the global consumptions, giv 
technical coefficients. 
2. For the firms: 
i so as to - Determine the technical coefficients ee 
Minimize their production costs under 
prices of their inputs. 
ve: Finally, in the Heald procedure, we ha 
1. For the CPB: 
a 
: all goods; 
- Calculate the Marginal social values of 
tions to 
- Solve a set of simultaneous linear equa 
determine the new allocations. 
2. For the firms: 
; ivities - Calculate outputs and marginal producti d resource implied by their production functions an 
allocations. 
It seems difficult to assess realistically the : 
i sks. difficultues involved in each of the above eager a oe 
The reason for this is that, contrary to what rF assum alas 
development of the procedures, in reality, eae func _ 
production functions and most of the other economic reer 
involved are now known in an explicit form. In practice the | 
best we can hope for is a rough approximation of these economic 
. i ine how bstractions Consequently, it is difficult to imag c aps a 
these tasks would be implemented the practice. e
34 
problems. However, due to the linearity assumptions involved in the L.swn. Procedure it Seems tobe the RSE auitchte sap 
practical application in what concerns computational difficulties. However while this computational advantage is, toa large extent, due to the essumption of constant Teturns to scale, 
this very assumpticn imposes a strong restriction on the nature of the economy. 
procedures, the Heal Procedure seems | 
While the other two dependeng ° 
production bessibility sets, 
existence of non-convexities, 
With respect to be convergence Properties, we have already sean (subsection 5.1.3) that the L.s.m, brocedure is ina general advantage over the Arrow-Hurwics Procedure, The comparison between the L.S.M. ana the Heal Procedure does not yield a definite conclusion, since both Satisfy the feasibility, monotonicity and assy 
ties ' 
In practice the more meani 
istic is 
Unfortunately, almost nothing 
+S known of how the thrae Procedures compare in this respect, 
5 = anc we shouid expect this result to depend cn the Specific 
Problem at hana, 
. 
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l uld t d me mor
e oeneral 
< 
Final Yo oO no avol rawin 
conclusions from this study. 
i of 
First, we the 
practice notice that the theory and Pp 
al : : h other. 
By 
plann are still ver ar from eac d ntra ized pl ing ill y f£ ece 
B 
re 1 efforts a s, this implies that the theoretica no means,
alysing ork for an i they provide a sound framew useless, since 
tion. Some important ideas of decentraliza 
on t d 




if application £ he other han ’ 
UW i to short r Planning procedures as the only guide ead eae 
to e if llocation for the entire economy seems a  n 
in sectors 1 of certain a t follow that application to contro 0€s no o 
ntageous. of the economy is not possible and adva 
T iti 1 int f the essful narrowing 
nh critica points or succ ree 
seen to be: of the gap between theory and practice 
dilv ing only rea 4 ) Development of procedures requirinc 





erat ns of i 
nee in the first fe ) Fast conver 
e ion  the 
procedure, 
utational 
) Reasonable informational and comp c 
requirements.
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E ven though the present achievements of decentralized 
planning procedures are still far from the ideal this should ’ 8 shou 
not consti 
j 
stitute a reason for 3 ing the idea of a soci list 
reject 
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